Abstract We reformulate a key definition given by Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) to provide semantics for public announcements in subset spaces. More precisely, we interpret the precondition for a public announcement of ϕ to be the "local truth" of ϕ, semantically rendered via an interior operator. This is closely related to the notion of ϕ being "knowable". We argue that these revised semantics improve on the original and offer several motivating examples to this effect. A key insight that emerges is the crucial role of topological structure in this setting. Finally, we provide a simple axiomatization of the resulting logic and prove completeness.
Introduction
In the standard semantics for epistemic logic, knowledge is represented in terms of possibility: associated with each world w is a set of worlds R(w) representing those states of affairs that are compatible with the agent's knowledge; the agent is said to know ϕ at w just in case ϕ is true at all worlds in R(w) (Hintikka, 1962) . In this context, a world represents a particular arrangement of facts, while a set of worlds represents a particular state of knowledge.
Consider now a set of sets of worlds, S: such an object might be construed as representing not how things are or what is known, but what is knowable. Roughly speaking, by restricting attention to models in which each R(w) ∈ S, we constrain the possible states of knowledge to exactly those in S.
Subset space semantics (Dabrowski et al., 1996) put this intuition at center stage. In this formalism, the usual relation R is replaced with a collection S as above, and formulas are evaluated with respect to world-set pairs (w,U), where w ∈ U ∈ S, rather than just worlds. In this context, U is called the epistemic range. Thus, the possible states of knowledge become an explicit parameter of the model. This provides a convenient setting for studying the dynamics of knowledge: learning something new can be captured by shrinking the epistemic range, for instance by transitioning from (w,U) to (w,V ), where V ⊆ U. Such dynamics are a core concern of subset space logic, which includes an epistemic effort modality quantifying over all ways of shrinking the epistemic range in order to express this abstract notion of learning.
One concrete and popular manifestation of epistemic effort is that which results from a public announcement (Plaza, 2007) . Intuitively, in the case of a single agent, a public announcement of ϕ simply causes the agent to learn that ϕ is (or was) true. Subset space models, being well-suited to implementing epistemic updates as discussed above, are a natural and appealing framework in which to interpret public announcements. Somewhat surprisingly, it is only quite recently that this project has been been taken up. Balbiani et al. (2013) interpret an announcement of ϕ in subset space models by essentially the same mechanism as in more standard settings: namely, by deleting those objects that do not satisfy ϕ. Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) , by contrast, interpret announcements using the learning mechanism that is built into the definition of subset space models: that is, by shrinking the epistemic range. It is this latter approach that we focus on.
This article presents a topological reformulation of the semantics for public announcements given by Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) . The presence of topological structure is convenient for many applications of interest, but the motivation for this project runs deeper: I argue that topology is an essential ingredient for the appropriate interpretation of public announcements. This argument is based on two related criticisms of the model presented by Wáng andÅgotnes. First, the preconditions they impose for announcements are too strong: certain formulas that really ought to be announceable in their system are not (see Example 2). Second, the epistemic updates produced by successful announcements are not strong enough: loosely speaking, one ought to be able to infer from an announcement of p not only that p is true, but that p is knowable (see Example 3). In both cases, the resolution of these criticisms motivates and relies upon the foundational topological notion of "local truth".
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the basics of subset spaces and public announcements, and review the semantics defined by Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) . In Section 3, I motivate a revision to these semantics by exhibiting some key interpretational difficulties they face; I then define a topological reformulation and show how it resolves these issues. Section 4 presents technical results associated with the new topological semantics, including a sound and complete axiomatization. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of related and future work.
Preliminaries

Subset Space Semantics
A subset space is a pair (X, S) where X = / 0 is a set of worlds (or states, or points, etc.) and S ⊆ 2 X is a collection of subsets of X. Intuitively, elements of X represent ways the world might be, while sets in S represent possible states of knowledge.
To make these intuitions precise, consider the (single-agent) epistemic language EL recursively generated by the grammar
where p ∈ PROP, the (countable) set of primitive propositions. Read Kϕ as "the agent knows ϕ". A subset model X = (X, S, v) is a subset space (X, S) together with a function v : PROP → 2 X specifying, for each primitive proposition p ∈ PROP, its extension v(p). Truth is evaluated with respect to epistemic scenarios, which are pairs of the form (x,U), where x ∈ U ∈ S. Let ES(X) denote the collection of all such pairs in X. Given an epistemic scenario (x,U) ∈ ES(X), the set U is called its epistemic range; it functions like an information set in the sense that knowledge statements at (x,U) are evaluated by universal quantification over U. More precisely, we interpret EL in X as follows: 1
We sometimes drop mention of the subset model X when it is clear from context. To get a better sense of how subset space semantics work, an example is helpful.
Example 1 (The Target and the Wall). Consider Figure 1 , depicting a rectangular room X into which you have launched a probe. You don't know exactly where it landed, but the probe can measure its distance from the sides of the room and send this data back to you. Of course, any such measurements come with some error. For example, though the probe may have landed at the point x, its measurements might only indicate that it is between 0.5 and 1.5 meters from the south wall, and between 4 and 5.5 meters from the east wall. This can be represented with a rectangle U, as shown. Let S consist of those regions of X that can be picked out as above; in other words, if we think of X as a region in R 2 , S can be defined as the set of all rectangles (a, b)× 1 The original definition of subset models (Dabrowski et al., 1996) was largely motivated by their use in interpreting a richer language containing a second modality representing "epistemic effort"; roughly speaking, this modality works by shrinking the epistemic range. In the present context, following Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) and in the spirit of Balbiani et al. (2008) , the mantle of "epistemic effort" is taken up by public announcements, so we omit the abstract effort modality. We return to discuss this further in Section 5. This definition allows us to put subset space semantics to work in formalizing our intuitions about the knowledge and uncertainty of the person who launched the probe. Suppose, for example, that the probe landed at the point x and returned the measurements above: this corresponds to the epistemic scenario (x,U). On the other hand, if the probe landed at x but failed to return any measurements, this would correspond to the epistemic scenario (x, X). The sets U and X represent the uncertainty that results from different measurements.
There is a target in the room as well as a wall. Assume that you know the location of these objects in advance. From certain vantage points within the room, the wall blocks the target; the shaded region B denotes the set of points where this is so. We might then think of B as the extension of a primitive proposition b ∈ PROP that says "the wall is blocking the target".
The relationship between the measurements returned by the probe and your state of knowledge regarding whether the wall is blocking the target is borne out by the semantics defined above. In particular, in the scenario where you receive measurements implying that the probe is in the region U, you ought to know on the basis of these measurements that the wall is blocking the target, and indeed we have (x,U) |= Kb. By contrast, in the scenario where you receive no measurements at all, intuitively, you do not know whether the wall is blocking the target, and this corresponds to the fact that (x, X) |= ¬Kb ∧ ¬K¬b. Similarly, if the probe lands at the point y ∈ B (where, intuitively, the wall is "just barely" blocking the target) and returns measurements indicating it lies in the region V , in the corresponding epistemic scenario (y,V ) we also have (y,V ) |= ¬Kb ∧ ¬K¬b. In fact, in this case, since y lies on the borderline between B and its complement, we can see that no measurement, no matter how precise, will yield knowledge of b or its negation.
Interpreting Public Announcements in Subset Models
We next review the basics of public announcements and the semantics offered by Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) for interpreting them in subset models. The (singleagent) public announcement language, denoted PAL, is recursively generated by the grammar
where p ∈ PROP. The formula [ϕ]ψ is read, "after an announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)". Traditionally, the interpretation of this formula is of the general form
where, loosely speaking, M| ϕ denotes the model obtained from M by deleting those truth-bearing objects (e.g., worlds) in M that do not satisfy ϕ (see, e.g., van Ditmarsch et al., 2008, Chapter 4) . In other words, provided ϕ is true, [ϕ]ψ holds just in case ψ is true when all ¬ϕ possibilities are removed.
As we have observed, subset spaces offer a model-internal mechanism for representing states of knowledge that obtain "after some effort". Wáng andÅgotnes (2013) leverage this fact to define an interpretation of public announcements in subset models that implements the update by shrinking the epistemic range rather than by altering the model itself. As a first attempt at defining such a semantics, we might consider the following:
where
called the extension of ϕ under U. The idea is that shrinking the epistemic range from U to ϕ U captures the effect of hearing a public announcement of ϕ. An immediate problem with this definition is that (x, ϕ U ) may not be an epistemic scenario: it is if and only if ϕ U ∈ S. Call the antecedent of the implication in (1) the precondition for the announcement, and the consequent the postcondition. The definition proposed by Wáng and Agotnes avoids the issue raised above by strengthening the precondition in such a way as to ensure that the postcondition is defined:
These semantics offer a way of interpreting public announcements that obviates the need to consider alternative models, thus elegantly realizing the central insight of Wáng andÅgotnes. Clearly, pre(ϕ) strengthens the classical precondition, which simply insists that ϕ be true. However, as we now show, this precondition is in fact too strong, and moreover, the postcondition is too weak.
Topological Subset Models
Motivation
For pre(ϕ) to hold in an epistemic scenario (x,U), two conditions must be satisfied. First, x must be in ϕ U , which is simply the subset model analogue of the classical precondition that ϕ be true. Second, we must have ϕ U ∈ S. It is tempting to read this latter condition as something like, "ϕ is knowable (given U)". After all, S collects precisely those subsets of X that can function as states of knowledge. But this reading is misleading: as the examples below make clear, it is possible to know ϕ even if its extension is not a member of S. Speaking abstractly, to insist that ϕ U ∈ S is to impose a "global" precondition on announcements where we should instead be appealing to a "local" condition. To make these ideas concrete, we return to the setting of Example 1.
Example 2 (The Target and the Wall, continued). Recall that you have launched a probe into a room containing a target and a wall, as depicted in Figure 1 . Due to our definition of S, which effectively identifies states of knowledge with certain types of measurements, we have b X = B / ∈ S (since B is not a rectangle). This implies that for all z ∈ X, (z, X) |= pre(b), and so by the definition given in (2), "the wall is blocking the target" is not announceable in any epistemic scenario of the form (z, X). 2 This seems wrong: there are some epistemic scenarios of the form (z, X) in which b really ought to be announceable. For instance, suppose that the probe in fact landed at the point x but you have received no measurements, corresponding to the epistemic scenario (x, X). In this case, not only is the wall blocking the target, but this fact is "knowable" in the sense that there is a measurement-for example, the rectangle U depicted in Figure 1 -that entails it. We might even imagine that some third party has intercepted the probe's transmission of the measurement U. An adequate theory of public announcements should predict that this third party can meaningfully announce to you, "The wall is blocking the target".
This highlights the "global versus local" distinction alluded to above: informally, although b X is not itself in S, there are elements of S that entail b, and in the right epistemic scenarios this seems sufficient to license the public announcement. Roughly speaking, we might say that b is locally true at (x, X) because x ∈ U ⊆ b X , and in general redefine the precondition for an announcement of ϕ so that it demands only local truth. We make these notions precise in Section 3.2.
Before turning to the formalism, we consider one more example of a rather different character.
Example 3 (The Jewel and the Tomb). You have learned from ancient historical records of the existence of a secret tomb within which was supposedly ensconced a priceless jewel. In point of fact, you have no idea whether a priceless jewel was actually placed within this tomb before it was sealed-perhaps that part of the historical record was simply an embellishment. You are also unsure as to whether this tomb is still lost or has been rediscovered in modern times (and its contents catalogued).
The relevant possibilities here can be captured with a four-state model: let X = {s JD , s JD , sJ D , sJD}, where each state in X encodes whether the tomb actually contains a jewel (J) or not (J), and whether it has been rediscovered in modern times (D) or not (D).
We also want our model to encode the fact that the only way to learn about the jewel is to discover the tomb (all other records of the jewel's existence, or lack thereof, having been irrevocably lost to time). Subset spaces are ideally suited to encoding such constraints on the possible states of knowledge; this is accomplished by controlling the elements of S. In this example, you could conceivably know whether or not the tomb has been discovered in modern times without knowing whether or not there is a jewel inside, corresponding to the two knowledge states {s JD , sJ D } and {s JD , sJD}. Furthermore, provided you know that the tomb has been discovered, you might also know whether or not a priceless jewel was found inside, corresponding to the two knowledge states {s JD } and {sJ D }. We therefore define
Crucially, we do not have, for example, {s JD } ∈ S, since this would correspond to a state of knowledge where you know both that the tomb has not been rediscovered in modern times and that there is a jewel inside. This is precisely what we want to rule out.
Let j and d be primitive propositions standing for "the jewel is in the tomb" and "the tomb has been discovered", respectively, and let v : { j, d} → 2 X be defined in the obvious way. Then it is easy to see that for all x ∈ X, (x, X) |= pre(¬ j ∧ ¬d); this follows from the fact that ¬ j ∧ ¬d X = {sJD} / ∈ S. This accords with the intuition that since you cannot know that the jewel is not in the tomb without also knowing that the tomb has been discovered, such a state of affairs should not be announceable.
However, it is also easy to see that (s JD , X) |= pre( j); this follows from the fact that j X = {s JD , s JD } / ∈ S. Thus, "the jewel is in the tomb" is not announceable even if the jewel really is in the tomb and the tomb has been discovered. This seems wrong-for instance, the person who discovered the tomb could have seen the jewel inside and then announced this fact. As in the previous example, this intuition is borne out in the notion of local truth: there is a state of knowledge {s JD } ∈ S that entails j, and this ought to be a sufficient condition for the announceability of j in the epistemic scenario (s JD , X).
Note also that {s JD } is the only element of S that entails j; this corresponds to the fact that the only way to learn about the jewel is to discover the tomb. As a consequence, any successful announcement of j should carry with it the implication that the tomb has already been discovered. In other words, we ought to have
The semantics defined by Wáng andÅgotnes do not give credence to these intuitions. First, as we saw, pre( j) is not satisfied at (s JD , X). Furthermore, since announcements in this framework have the effect of restricting the epistemic range to the extension of the announced formula, no inferences beyond the truth of that formula (and the logical consequences thereof) are supported. In particular, since j X ⊆ d X , j does not entail d, so even if j were announceable it would not result in d becoming known. This suggests that in addition to weakening the precondition for a public announcement, we also need to strengthen the postcondition.
Formal Semantics
The notion of "local truth" is naturally and succinctly captured in a topological framework. A topological space is a pair X = (X, T) where X is a nonempty set and T ⊆ 2 X is a collection of subsets of X that covers X and is closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions. The collection T is called a topology on X and elements of T are called open sets.
Topology might be described as the abstract mathematics of space. Roughly speaking, each open set can be viewed as encoding a notion of "nearness"; this notion is operationalized in the following definition. Given a set A ⊆ X, we say that x lies in the interior of A if there is some U ∈ T such that x ∈ U ⊆ A. The open set U acts a "witness" to x's membership in A: not only is x in A, but also all "nearby" points (i.e., all y ∈ U) are in A.
The set of all points in the interior of A is denoted int X (A). To ease notational clutter, we often drop the subscript and sometimes omit the parentheses. It is not hard to see that int(A) ∈ T: for each x ∈ int(A), there is by definition an open set U x such that x ∈ U x ⊆ A, and it is easy to check that x∈int(A) U x = int(A). In fact, int(A) is the largest open set contained in A. For a general introduction to topology we refer the reader to Munkres (2000) .
A topological subset model is a subset model X = (X, T, v) in which T is a topology on X. Since every topological space is a subset space, the epistemic intuitions for subset spaces apply also to topological spaces-we can identify open sets with measurements, or more generally with states of knowledge. But the additional topological structure allows us to go further: in particular, the notion of local truth motivated in Examples 2 and 3 coincides exactly with the definition of topological interior.
The core proposal of this paper is to interpret public announcements on topological spaces according to the following reformulated semantics:
To distinguish these semantics from those given in (2), we refer to them as "intsemantics" and "pre-semantics", respectively.
Since int-semantics make use of the interior operator, they are only defined on topological subset models, though of course pre-semantics also make sense in this setting. Comparing the two is instructive; they differ both in the precondition and the postcondition. We first observe that
and neither of the reverse implications holds in general; it follows that int(ϕ) is a strictly weaker condition than pre(ϕ) and a strictly stronger condition than ϕ. This, of course, is by design: as we show below, weakening the precondition in this way provides exactly the leeway needed to render the problematic "unannounceable" formulas considered in Examples 2 and 3 announceable. The postcondition, on the other hand, has been strengthened: the updated epistemic range in (3), namely int ϕ U , is a subset of the epistemic range in (2), which is just ϕ U . Note that ϕ U might not be open in our semantics (even when the precondition is satisfied), so it cannot, in general, serve as an epistemic range. Replacing it with its interior is a convenient fix for this technical issue. But there is a deeper motivation and broader import for this definition: a successful announcement of ϕ can carry more information than simply the content of ϕ itself. By replacing ϕ U with int ϕ U in the postcondition, we are effectively updating the agent's knowledge with not merely with the truth of ϕ, but with the announceability of ϕ. Said differently: when an agent hears a public announcement of ϕ, they can deduce not only that ϕ is true, but that ϕ is entailed by some state of knowledge-they come to know that the true state of the world is somewhere in
which is exactly int ϕ U . We explore these features of our semantics in the following examples. A preliminary definition is useful: given a collection of subsets C ⊆ 2 X that covers X, the topology generated by C, denoted T(C), is simply the smallest topology on X containing C. It is not hard to check that T(C) is equal to the set of all arbitrary unions of finite intersections of members of C.
Example 4 (The Target and the Wall, revisited). We first transform the subset model given in Example 1 into a topological model by replacing S with the topology it generates, T(S). Since S is already closed under finite intersections, this amounts simply to closing under unions. It is not hard to see that T(S) is the standard Euclidean topology on the plane relativized to X.
Expanding S to T(S) does not in itself solve the problems raised in Example 2: it is still the case, for instance, that (x, X) |= pre(b) (since b X = B is not open). But the presence of topological structure allows us to switch to int-semantics. Since x lies in the interior of B, we have (x, X) |= int(b); it follows that "the wall is blocking the target" is announceable at (x, X) according to int-semantics, as intuition suggests it ought to be. By contrast, a probe that landed at y would be incapable of transmitting any measurement that entails b; as such, we might expect that b is not announceable at (y, X), and indeed, we have (y, X) |= int(b) (since y / ∈ int(B)). Finally, we observe that after a successful announcement of b at (x, X), the updated epistemic range is not the extension of b, but rather its interior, int(B). This corresponds to the idea that an announcement of b in this epistemic scenario conveys more information than just the truth of b: it tells you in addition that the probe must have landed at a point where it can actually take some measurement that entails b. There are, of course, many such measurements-any open rectangle contained in B is such a measurement. The crucial point is this: to know that some one of these measurements must have been taken, but not which one in particular, is to know that the true state of the world lies in their union, int(B).
Example 5 (The Jewel and the Tomb, revisited). Once again, we extend the collection S given in Example 3 to the topology it generates:
As with pre-semantics, int-semantics determines that ¬ j ∧ ¬d is not announceable in any epistemic scenario of the form (x, X); this follows from the fact that int({sJD}) = / 0. By contrast, "the jewel is in the tomb" is announceable in the epistemic scenario (s JD , X)-as it ought to be-on account of the fact that int j X = int({s JD , s JD }) = {s JD }.
Observe also that the epistemic range in the postcondition for announcing j is int j X = {s JD }. Since (s JD , {s JD }) |= Kd, we therefore have (s JD , X) |= [ j]Kd, which is exactly the effect we sought in Example 3: the only way to learn about the jewel is to discover the tomb, so any successful announcement of j should carry with it the implication that the tomb has indeed been discovered.
Technical Results
Throughout this section, except where otherwise noted, we work with int-semantics as given in (3). We say that ϕ is valid and write |= ϕ if, for all topological subset models X and all epistemic scenarios (x,U) ∈ ES(X), we have (X, x,U) |= ϕ. We begin by establishing some basic properties of the int modality. Observe first that int(ϕ) is definable in PAL: it is semantically equivalent to the formula ¬[ϕ]⊥ (where ⊥ denotes some propositional contradiction). As such, we can freely add the int modality to PAL without changing the expressivity of the language, and in the following we take this for granted.
The properties of a modalized interior operator have been thoroughly investigated (see, e.g., Aiello et al., 2003; van Benthem and Bezhanishvili, 2007) , so much of the following proposition should come as little surprise.
Proposition 1. For all ϕ, ψ ∈ PAL, the following hold:
Proof. Parts (a) through (d) constitute a standard S4 axiomatization of the interior operator, and the proof that they hold in this setting is analogous to the usual proof. Part (e) follows from the fact that
Parts (f) and (g) are included to exhibit some of the differences between pre(ϕ) (for which these two schemes are valid) and int(ϕ). Let X be a subset of the plane equipped with the standard Euclidean subspace topology. Assume that U is an open subset of X, as shown in Figure 2 , and let v(p) = U ∪ {y}. Then it is easy to check that (x, X) |= int(p) → K(p → int(p)) and (y, X) |= ¬(p → int(p)) → K¬int(p).
Fig. 2 Counterexamples
Although int is definable in PAL, it also makes sense to consider in a language without public announcements. This plays an important role in our axiomatization. Let EL int be recursively generated by the grammar
where p ∈ PROP. This language is interpreted in topological subset models in the obvious way; in particular, the semantics of int are given as before by (4).
EL int is an extension of EL and is strictly more expressive, since EL cannot define int(ϕ). To show this, we first recall the following definition (Wáng and Agotnes, 2013, Definition 8): given two subset models X and X , a relation between ES(X) and ES(X ) is called a partial bisimulation (between X and X ) if whenever (x,U) (x ,U ), the following conditions are satisfied:
This is the natural analogue of the usual notion of bisimulation defined on relational structures (see, e.g., Blackburn et al., 2001 ). An easy structural induction over EL yields the following invariance result.
Proposition 2. Let be a partial bisimulation between subset models X and X with (x,U) (x ,U ). Then for all ϕ ∈ EL,
Proposition 3. EL int is strictly more expressive than EL.
Proof. By Proposition 2, it suffices to show that int(p) can distinguish two epistemic scenarios that are linked by a partial bisimulation. Consider the topological subset models X = ({x, y}, 2 {x,y} , v) and
where v(p) = {x}. Thus, in X we have the discrete topology, while in Y the singleton {y} is open but {x} is not. It is easy to check that the relation given by
is a partial bisimulation. However, we have (X, x, {x, y}) |= int(p), since
Hence, int(p) cannot be equivalent to any formula of EL.
Of course, this result also shows that PAL is strictly more expressive than EL (in int-semantics). On the other hand, EL int and PAL are equally expressive: in essence, this is because the following reduction schemes allow us to rewrite any formula of PAL as a logically equivalent formula of EL int (cf. Wáng andÅgotnes, 2013, Theorem 11).
Proposition 4. The following PAL formulas are valid:
Proof. The first three equivalences are straightforward to prove. To show that
is valid, first note that if (x,U) |= int(ϕ) then this equivalence holds trivially at (x,U). Otherwise, assuming that (x,U) |= int(ϕ), we have:
As above, this equivalence holds trivially at (x,U) when (x,U) |= int(ϕ), so assume that (x,U) |= int(ϕ). We then have:
and
Now observe that
so clearly any witness V ∈ T to (5) also satisfies (6). Conversely, given a V satisfying (6), let V = V ∩ int ϕ U . By assumption, x ∈ int ϕ U , so we have x ∈ V , and it is easy to see that V is a witness to (5). Finally, to see that
where the last line follows from the fact that
On the other hand,
thus, to complete the proof it suffices to show that
By definition,
where the third line follows from the fact that int ϕ U ⊆ U, and the last line follows from (7). Since int 2 = int, this establishes (8).
It remains to show that these reduction schemes actually allow us to rewrite any PAL formula as an equivalent EL int formula. For this, the following definition is useful (cf. Wáng andÅgotnes, 2013, Definition 22): the complexity c(ϕ) of any PAL formula ϕ is defined recursively by
Lemma 1. Each of the six reduction schemes in Proposition 4 reduces complexity from left to right: the complexity of the formula on the righthand side of the biconditional is less than the complexity of the formula on the lefthand side.
Proof. To begin, observe that
Now it is easy to check that
We also have
The calculations for the reduction schemes corresponding to the K and int modalities proceed analogously. Next, we have
And finally:
Proposition 5. For all PAL formulas ϕ, there exists an EL int formulaφ such that |= ϕ ↔φ.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on c(ϕ). If c(ϕ) = 1, then ϕ ∈ PROP and we can takeφ = ϕ. Now suppose that c(ϕ) > 1, and assume inductively that the result holds for all formulas with complexity less than c(ϕ). There are several cases to consider, depending on the structure of ϕ. If ϕ = ¬ψ for some ψ, then c(ψ) < c(ϕ), so by the inductive hypothesis there is an EL int formulaψ such that |= ψ ↔ψ. It follows that |= ϕ ↔ ¬ψ, which establishes the desired result. The cases corresponding to ϕ = Kψ and ϕ = int(ψ) are handled analogously. The case where ϕ = ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 is also similar: since c(ψ 1 ) < c(ϕ) and c(ψ 2 ) < c(ϕ), we can find EL int formulasψ 1 andψ 2 such that |= ψ 1 ↔ψ 1 and |= ψ 2 ↔ψ 2 , hence |= ϕ ↔ (ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 ).
The final case is when ϕ = [ψ]χ. By applying one of the reduction schemes in Proposition 4, we can find a formula ξ such that |= ϕ ↔ ξ ; moreover, by Lemma 1, we know that c(ξ ) < c(ϕ). The inductive hypothesis now applies to give us an EL int formulaξ such that |= ξ ↔ξ . Of course, we then have |= ϕ ↔ξ , which completes the proof.
At last we turn our attention to a sound and complete axiomatization of PAL in int-semantics. We first axiomatize EL int and then use the reduction schemes to transform this into an axiomatization of PAL.
Let CPL denote the axioms and rules of classical propositional logic, let S4 int denote the S4 axioms and rules for the int modality, and let S5 K denote the S5 axioms and rules for the K modality (see, e.g., Fagin et al., 1995) . Let (KI) denote the axiom scheme Kϕ → int(ϕ), and set
Theorem 1. EL int is a sound and complete axiomatization of EL int .
Proof. Soundness of CPL + S5 K is easy to show in the usual way, while soundness of S4 int + (KI) follows from Proposition 1.
Completeness can be proved by a relatively straightforward canonical model construction. Let X denote the set of all maximal (EL int -)consistent subsets of EL int . Define a relation ∼ on X by
Clearly ∼ is an equivalence relation; let [x] denote the equivalence class of x under ∼. These equivalence classes partition X according to what is known, but we cannot simply take the set of epistemic ranges to be {[x] : x ∈ X}, since we require this set to be a topology on X and to interact with the int modality in the right way. So we need to do a bit more work to define T.
For each ϕ ∈ EL int , let ϕ := {x ∈ X : ϕ ∈ x}. Roughly speaking, sets of the form int(ϕ) ought to be interiors in whatever topology we define; more precisely, if we have any hope of proving the Truth Lemma, below, then at a minimum we need to ensure that these sets are open. Thus, in order to respect both the int and the K modalities, we define
: ϕ ∈ EL int and x ∈ X , and let T be the topology generated by B. In fact, it is not difficult to show (using S4 int ) that B is a basis for T. 4 For each p ∈ PROP, set v(p) := p. Let X = (X, T, v). Clearly X is a topological subset model.
Lemma 2 (Truth Lemma). For every
Proof. First we note that int( ) = X, and thus for all x ∈ X we have
3 This axiom system is closely related to an axiomatization presented by Goranko and Passy (1992) for a bimodal language containing both a "local" modality (quantifying over all accessible worlds in a relational structure) and a "global" modality (quantifying over all worlds in the structure). In the subset space setting, the knowledge operator can be construed as a kind of global modality if one ignores the existence of states outside the current epistemic range. And indeed, the axiomatization of the universal modality given by Goranko and Passy consists in the standard S5 axioms together with what they call the "inclusion" axiom scheme, which corresponds exactly to our scheme (KI). Thanks to AybükeÖzgün for pointing out this connection. 4 B is a basis for a topology T if every element of T is a union of elements of B.
As usual, the proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case holds by definition of v, and the inductive steps for the Boolean connectives are straightforward.
So suppose the result holds for ϕ; let us show that it holds for Kϕ. If Kϕ ∈ x, then by definition of ∼ we know that (∀y ∈ [x])(Kϕ ∈ y). But Kϕ ∈ y ⇒ ϕ ∈ y, so (∀y ∈ [x])(ϕ ∈ y), which by the inductive hypothesis implies that (∀y ∈ [x]) ((y, [y] ) |= ϕ).
For the converse, suppose that Kϕ / ∈ x. Then {Kψ : Kψ ∈ x} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent, for if not there is a finite subset Γ ⊆ {Kψ : Kψ ∈ x} such that χ∈Γ χ → ϕ (where denotes provability in EL int ), from which it follows (using S5 K ) that χ∈Γ χ → Kϕ, which implies Kϕ ∈ x, a contradiction. Therefore, we can extend {Kψ : Kψ ∈ x} ∪ {¬ϕ} to some y ∈ X; by construction, we have y ∈ [x] and ϕ / ∈ y. This latter fact, by the inductive hypothesis, yields (y, [y]) |= ϕ and thus (y,
Now let us suppose that the result holds for ϕ and work to show that it also must hold for int(ϕ). If int(ϕ) ∈ x, then observe that
this is an easy consequence of the fact that int(ϕ) → ϕ.
Now by the inductive hypothesis we have
which by (9) yields
of course, in this case it must be that [z] = [x] . This implies that for all y ∈ [x], if int(ψ) ∈ y then ϕ ∈ y. From this we can deduce that {Kψ : Kψ ∈ x} ∪ {¬(int(ψ) → ϕ)} is inconsistent, for if not it could be extended to a y ∈ [x] with int(ψ) ∈ y but ϕ / ∈ y, a contradiction. Thus, we can find a finite subset Γ ⊆ {Kψ : Kψ ∈ x} such that χ∈Γ χ → (int(ψ) → ϕ),
This implies that K(int(ψ) → ϕ) ∈ x, so by (KI) we know also that int(int(ψ) → ϕ) ∈ x, from which it follows (using S4 int ) that int(ψ) → int(ϕ) ∈ x. Since x ∈ int(ψ), we conclude that int(ϕ) ∈ x, as desired.
Completeness, of course, is an easy consequence: if ϕ is not a theorem of EL int , then {¬ϕ} is consistent and can be extended to some x ∈ X, in which case by Lemma 2 we have (X, x, [x]) |= ϕ.
Let PAL int denote EL int together with the six reduction schemes given in Proposition 4. Corollary 1. PAL int is a sound and complete axiomatization of PAL (with respect to int-semantics).
Proof. Soundness follows from soundness of EL int together with Proposition 4. For completeness, let ϕ be a valid PAL formula. Then we can find an EL int formulaφ such that PAL int ϕ ↔φ; this can be seen by running essentially the same argument presented in Proposition 5, replacing |= with PAL int . Nowφ is valid because ϕ is, so by completeness of EL int we can deduce that EL intφ , and so PAL intφ , hence PAL int ϕ.
Discussion
Subset spaces are a natural setting in which to model the dynamics of knowledge. But the semantic tools they offer are not quite enough for a satisfying interpretation of public announcements. Intuitively, ϕ is announceable exactly when some state of knowledge entails ϕ, but this notion of announceability need not itself be represented as a knowledge state, and so cannot in general serve as the foundation for an epistemic update.
Topological structure offers an elegant solution: the announceability of ϕ is realized as the topological interior of (the extension of) ϕ, which therefore becomes both the precondition for and the content of a successful announcement of ϕ, as given by (3). Examples 4 and 5 show that this topological definition has significant advantages over the semantics proposed by Wáng andÅgotnes (2013): more formulas are announceable, and successful announcements have implications that go beyond the mere truth of the announced formula. Moreover, from a technical standpoint, a modalized interior operator is a familiar and well-studied object, so its central role in our semantics situates this work in the broad context of topological semantics for modal (and especially epistemic) logics.
The epistemic interpretation of the int modality is of interest in this regard. In motivating our use of the interior operator, we touched on intuitions of "knowability", and indeed it is tempting to think of int(ϕ) as expressing that ϕ is knowable. However, this turns out to be problematic for essentially the same reasons that Moore formulas are problematic (Moore, 1942) . Recall the setting of The Target and the Wall as depicted in Figure 1 , and consider the Moore formula µ = b ∧ ¬Kb. It is easy to see that (x, X) |= int(µ) since, for instance, x ∈ U ⊆ B = µ X . On the other hand, (x,U) |= Kµ; in fact, Kµ entails both Kb and ¬Kb, a contradiction. So in this straightforward sense, µ is not knowable.
Loosely speaking, this discrepancy stems from the kind of appeal being made to the state of knowledge U: although U acts as a witness to (x, X) satisfying int(µ), it is not, in this capacity, ever treated as the epistemic range with respect to which knowledge statements in the language are evaluated. As soon as it is, µ is falsified.
This distinction can be captured formally with an epistemic effort modality as in the original development of subset space logic: Dabrowski et al. (1996) work with an enriched language including formulas of the form 3ϕ, interpreted by (X, x,U) |= 3ϕ iff (∃V ∈ T)(x ∈ V ⊆ U and (X, x,V ) |= ϕ).
Such a formula might be read, "after some (epistemic) effort, ϕ holds". This makes the formula 3Kϕ an intuitive candidate for expressing knowability, and the argument above demonstrates that int(µ) and 3Kµ are not equivalent. Enriching our logical setting to include the effort modality would provide a formal framework in which to investigate the relationship between these two notions of knowability, and more generally between abstract epistemic effort and public announcements. This is the subject of ongoing research.
In a very similar vein, the link between knowability and announcements has been investigated by Balbiani et al. (2008) , who extend the syntax of the language of public announcements with an additional arbitrary announcement modality we might denote by [ * ]; roughly speaking, [ * ]ϕ is true when all (suitably chosen) formulas ψ are such that [ψ]ϕ holds. The dualized version * ϕ is therefore naturally read as, "there is an announcement after which ϕ is true". This too yields a plausible candidate for knowability: * Kϕ, that which becomes known after some announcement (van Benthem, 2004) . In recent work, van Ditmarsch et al. (2014) extend the logical system we have developed here to include just such an arbitrary announcement modality (their work cites an earlier, unpublished draft of this paper (Bjorndahl, 2013) ).
Building on this work, van Ditmarsch et al. (2015) extend the logic further to a multi-agent framework. Multi-agent extensions are valuable generalizations of any single-agent epistemic framework, but in this setting there may be a special significance for interpreting the int modality. In our semantics, the epistemic range of a given epistemic scenario is keyed to the mental state of a particular agent-namely, the one who hears the announcement. But in the example above, the "witness" U to x being in int µ X does not function as an epistemic range, but merely as an information set. This suggests that a more suitable reading for int(ϕ) might be, "ϕ is knowable by some third party", or perhaps even, "ϕ is known to the one who made the announcement". A multi-agent logic rich enough to represent public announcements along with their agential sources (e.g., "after an announcement of ϕ by agent i...") might therefore be just the right setting in which to truly understand the epistemics of the int modality.
